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Introduction
Entitlement figures from private pension schemes can be already obtained from national accounts. These figures, however, reflect only a part of households' pension wealth.
Especially in Europe the predominant part of pension benefits is derived from public, pay-asyou-go (PAYG) pension schemes. So far this large share of households' pension entitlements can, generally, not be derived from actual accounts. The aim of the recent updates of the of the System of National Accounts (SNA2008) and its European counterpart, the European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA2010), is to bridge this gap by providing figures on unfunded public pension entitlements. 1 In this course it will become mandatory for European countries to publish annual estimates of unfunded pension rights from 2017 onwards. From the households' viewpoint this new figure can be interpreted as an asset or entitlement, namely an unfunded public pension entitlement (UPPE). From the government perspective this figure represents an obligation or liability, more precisely an accrued-todate liability (ADL).
The present article provides a detailed analysis of the methodological concepts behind these new figures of national accounts (Chapter 2). Furthermore, it reviews past studies on unfunded public pension entitlements (Chapter 3) and provides the largest cross-country comparison of unfunded public pension wealth for the EU so far (Chapter 4). On this basis the main determining factors for the observed heterogeneity of pension entitlements across
Europe are presented and scrutinized in a sensitivity analysis (Chapter 5). Finally, a number of possible applications of these new figures of national accounts are discussed in Chapter 6.
This includes the possible use of these figures to estimate the offset between unfunded pension entitlements and savings rates (Feldstein, 1974) . In addition, some insights into the distribution of households' wealth across European countries are provided. Contrary to past international wealth estimates by Davies et al. (2011) and the ECB -European Central Bank (2013), we take into account not only financial-and non-financial assets (dwellings) but also unfunded pension wealth. We can show that many prosperity differences between countries with Beveridgean and Bismarkian pension systems as well as between western and central eastern European countries are eliminated when considering all three of these households'
assets. In addition, we show that there are substantial differences between the replacement rates and our ADL variable. Finally, two annexes provide some more technical details on the methodology of determining unfunded public pension liabilities and give a first insight into the new supplementary table on pension schemes to be introduced in European national accounts from 2017 onwards.
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Concepts of measuring implicit pension liabilities
From the households' perspective unfunded pension entitlements (UPPE) can be regarded as an asset -so far, generally, not included in wealth estimates. From the government perspective these entitlements translate into a liability often referred to as an implicit pension debt (IPD) . For further analysis it should be made clear what kind of liability is referred to, and to which degree entitlements from private households are included. In the literature, three main definitions of pension liabilities are well-established:
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Accrued-to-date liabilities (ADL)
: these contain the actual pension payments and the present value of pensions to be paid in the future on the basis of accrued rights; no rights can be accrued after the base year -neither by present nor by future workers.
Current workers and pensioners' liabilities (CWL):
in this case allowance is made for the pension scheme to continue its existence until the last contributor of today dies, while no new entrants are allowed. With this concept, not only ADL is covered but also the present value of pension entitlements that will be accrued by current contributors due to their future contributions.
Open-system liabilities (OSL): these also include the present value of pensions of new workers entering the respective pension scheme. In other words, it is assumed that the pension scheme will be continued for a relatively long time horizon; the range of options extends from including only children not yet in the labour force, to an infinite perspective. 
1) + 2) + Present value of pensions due to contributions of future (worker's) generations
Source: own illustration based on Holzmann et al. (2004) . Table 1 demonstrates that the difference between the three main definitions of pension liabilities reflects alternative views on how future pension benefits should be considered. For instance, looking at the concept of open system liabilities, current pensioners and workers as well as future workers (and thus all future retirees) are taken into consideration. In contrast, accrued-to-date liabilities regard only rights accrued by existing and former workers until the base year.
In this study we focus on gross liability concepts. In other words, liabilities are not confronted by any kind of revenues or existing assets. 4 Additionally, we concentrate on the concept and estimation of ADL. For this liability type two different estimation approaches have been chosen in the past literature: the projected benefit obligations approach (PBO) and the accumulated benefit obligations approach (ABO) . The crucial difference between these two methods concerns the treatment of future wage increases. Under the PBO treatment, (expected) future pay increases -whether determined by promotions and/or general wage growth -are taken fully into account. Pension rights accrued by current contributors are increased in line with these expected pay increases. The ABO method, on the contrary, considers only the present value of benefits earned up to date, based on the past earnings history.
There are clearly advantages and disadvantages of each approach. Generally, it is outlined that the probability of a termination of the respective pension plan assessed (before the end of the worker's career) should determine which method to apply. If the respective pension scheme will exist until the end of the worker´s career, his or her future wage growth should be taken into account applying the PBO method. Therefore, especially in the case of pension plans for government employees this approach is often recommended since the probability that the employer will dismiss the employee in mid-career is quite low. 5 Given this background, the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS25) opted for the PBO approach to measure obligations of DB plans. 6 Also most business accounting rules, namely the International Accounting Standards (ISA 19), require a PBO procedure. For the case of social security pension schemes the PBO method seems appropriate, too, since an early termination of these schemes is normally not expected.
Previous implicit pension liability estimations for European countries
First estimates of ADL of unfunded public pension schemes on an international level have been provided by Van den Noord and Herd (1993) , Chand and Jaeger (1996) followed by Kuné (2000) . The latest international estimates were presented by Holzmann et al. (2004) who examined public pension systems of 35 low and middle income countries. In all past cross country studies the size of ADL is substantial. The implicit pension debt ranged from 55 to 357 percent of GDP in EU and G7 countries (see Table 2 ). The average of ADL reached a level between 100 and 200 percent of GDP in studies carried out in the 1990s.
The most recent survey by Holzmann et al. (2004) recorded higher average ADL of 224 percent of GDP. In our cross-county comparison implicit pension debt amounted to an average of 263 % of GDP. Generally, one may conclude that the value of ADL is significantly higher than the recorded public debt.
5 See e.g. Reinsdorf (2010), p. 190 et seq. 6 In fact, the IPSAS25 require an entity to use the Projected Unit Credit Method which is equivalent to the PBO approach. 7 These estimates are based on a large cross-country benchmark calculation carried out by Müller et al. (2009) . 
Which factors explain the difference to previous studies
Remarkable is the high variation within the studies but also between the surveys for a given country (see Table 2 ). The latter, the standard deviation between the surveys can be mainly explained by three factors: 1) the concept chosen (PBO or ABO), 2) the assumptions and 3) the coverage of pension types considered. All studies except for Kune (2000) consider a future increase of earnings for the projection of accrued pension rights and apply the PBO approach. 8 The outcomes of Kune (2000) are therefore lower than the other cross-country comparisons of ADL. The impact of the earnings growth on the pension indexation is, however, not always accounted for in the ADL estimations. Van den Noord and Herd (1993) apply a price indexation for all countries, while Holzmann et al. (2004) adjust benefits with the increase of wages in all surveyed states. The latter approach leads, generally, to higher results. Chand and Jaeger (1996) , on the contrary, take into account the actual, different indexation regimes applied in each country. We outline further below in the sensitivity analysis that the choice of the pension indexation has a significant impact on the overall level of ADL. Our estimates are also based on the PBO approach and we follow the country specific indexation rules.
EU and G7 countries assessed
A key assumption for the valuation of future pension rights represents the discount rate. It determines significantly the level of ADL (see sensitivity analysis in section 5). Relatively similar values of the discount rate have been chosen in past cross-country studies. Chand and Jaeger (1996) apply a discount rate of 3.5 % in real terms, Van den Noord and Herd (1993) use a starting value of 4 % which decreases gradually to 3 percent in the period of 2010-2050. Holzmann et al. (2004) and Kuné (2000) use a discount rate of 4 percent. We apply a discount rate of 3 percent in real terms over the entire projection horizon.
Also the choice of the general wage growth rate is relatively akin in previous studies, except for Kuné (2000) who applies a wage growth rate of zero, in line with the ABO approach (see Table 3 ). Our cross country estimates are based on a homogeneous wage growth rate of 1.5 percent in real terms. Finally, the impact of these economic assumptions is determined by the differential between the applied wage growth rate and discount rate. This value is slightly lower in our cross-country study which may partly explain our relatively higher ADL results (see Table 2 ). 
Results
Which factors explain the heterogeneity across Europe?
Which factors may determine the variation of ADL estimates within a cross country study?
This question shall be addressed in the following paragraphs. We discuss differences of unfunded public pension entitlements for 18 EU member states. 9 See Kuné (2000) , Van den Noord and Herd (1993) . 10 See Holzmann et al. (2004) . 11 Some countries, namely the Netherlands, Finland, Greece and the Czech Republic, have a separate government employee pension schemes which is not covered in Figure 1 . The Dutch government employee pension schemes are funded and therefore not recorded in Figure 1 . For Finland and the Czech Republic government employee pension schemes have been recorded as social security expenditures. No separate data was available for Greece. Table 4 ). The majority of countries surveyed feature pension expenditures in the range of about seven to ten per cent of GDP. Rather low expenditures can be observed in the two Baltic countries Lithuania (6.5) and Latvia (5.9) as well as in the Netherlands (6.3). Interesting is that the cross-country ranking of initial pension expenditures follows closely the ranking of pension entitlements in the observed states. The five countries with the highest expenditures also dispose the highest pension entitlements. As initial pension expenditures seem to have a large impact on pension entitlements a closer look shall be taken at the driving factors of these pension expenditures (see Table 4 below). First, the demographic composition, i.e. the number of retirees, affects the countries level of pension expenditures. Here Germany, Italy and Sweden feature the oldest populations with an old age dependency ratio of 45 -defined as the number of elderly people (aged 60 years and older) per hundred people of the working age population (aged 20-59 years). New EU member states, on the contrary, are still relatively young which inter alia explains the relatively low pension expenditures, generally, observed in these countries. Of course, the old age dependency ratio only provides a first hint of the number of pensioners. The definition of "being old" varies -though not extensively -in Europe (see Table 4 ). While the average age to leave the labour market amounts to 61.1 years in our sample, significantly lower values can be observed in countries such as France (58.9 years) or Slovakia (59.2 years). This gives one explanation why France though showing an average old age dependency ratio still features relatively high pension expenditures.
Additionally, the generosity of a pension scheme plays an important role for the level of pension expenditures and analogously the level of ADL. It may be summarized by the 1 Own illustation based on data provided by national central banks and statistical institutes. These expenditures cover all public unfunded pensions except for social assistance benefits -which are paid irrespective of any contribution having been made -are excluded (if possible) as they are not regarded as entitlements.
5 In CZ and FI government employee pensions are categorized as social security pensions.Therefore they are not covered here. Government employee pension schemes in the Netherlands are funded. For Greece a further differentiation of pension schemes and benefit types was not possible.
indicator of the gross replacement rate which reflects the ratio of an average new pension benefit in the base year (here 2006) to average earnings in the previous year (here 2005).
For our country sample this ratio amounts on average to 62 per cent (see Table 4 ).
Interesting is the relatively high standard deviation (18.5 per cent) of gross replacement rates across Europe. Rather high values can be observed Greece (100.5 per cent) and Spain (90.5 per cent) while the pension schemes in the Netherlands (29.6 per cent) and Germany (43 per cent) only provide relatively modest replacement rates. However, it should be noted that the replacement rates shown in Table 4 only cover old age pensions of statutory pension schemes. 12 A number of other pension schemes are not covered by this indicator, namely: 1) government employees and farmers pensions schemes -which usually are relatively generous -as well as 2) disability and 3) survivors' pensions. 13 It may be therefore, not a coincidence that the five countries with the highest pension expenditures all possess a special pension schemes for civil servants since these schemes tend to be more generous than the national pension schemes (Palacios and Whitehouse, 2006).
Future number of retirees
However, the level of pension expenditures in the base year represents only a starting point for the estimation of aggregated pension rights. The total of pension entitlements comprises all future pension benefits (paid out after the base year) which have been accrued-to-date.
These future benefits are mainly driven by the development of retirees in the coming decades. 12 Furthermore, the informational value of the replacement rate is limited as it outlines the relative pension level only for the group of new pensioners in the base year. All other retirees are not covered -their replacement rate may vary considerably from new pensioners. 13 In some countries such as Austria and Poland these other non-old age pension schemes represent almost half of the overall pension expenditures. Consequently, the indicator of the gross replacement rate provided by the European Commission -covering only old age pensions of the statutory pension scheme -may be less representative for the overall generosity of public pensions in these countries. paths differ across the EU, most countries adopted one or a bundle of the following instruments: 1) increase of retirement age, 2) change of benefit formula, 3) introduction of demographic factors or NDC systems and 4) change of the pension indexation (see Table 5 below). As we estimate pension entitlements for the base year 2006 only reforms legislated until the end of 2006 are taken into account in Table 5 . 
For a further detailed description of the reforms see Müller et al. (2009) .
2 A numeric calculation of the reform impact on the level of pension entitlements is not feasible for most countries as the reform effects are partially already covered by base year pension data. Furthermore, the timing of reforms and the groups affected by these measures vary greatly between countries. 3 Only minor modifications of the pension system in Greece have been adopted until our base year 2006. They have no impact on our results.
contribution (NDC) systems (LV, SE, IT and PL) the future replacement rates will shrink considerably.
Changes of indexation rules affect future benefit levels and analogously accrued current pension rights, too. Most EU countries shifted from a wage to a price or a mix indexation in recent years (FR, AT). As the retirement indexation effect accumulates over the entire retirement span, it is quite decisive for the level of pension entitlements -see sensitivity analysis in chapter 5. Source: own illustration.
After examining the development of elderly age groups as well as the impact of reforms and the pension indexation, the initial level still seems to be the most important determining factor regarding the level of pension liabilities of a certain country. Hence, it can be stated that the fewer points a country shows in total, the smaller are its pension liabilities in terms of GDP. However, it should be underlined that the initial level of pensions apparently is the main determining factor for the level of pension liabilities. 
Sensitivity analysis
To understand the outcomes of the model it is essential to grasp the channels which lead to the respective results. In this context it is of interest how the outcomes change if one varies the assumptions taken. Sensitivity analyses which assess the robustness of a model are useful tools for this purpose. The following section provides a case study of the various factors determining the level of ADL for the example of Portugal. Table 8 illustrates the respective sensitivity analysis of the discount and wage growth rate. Looking at these results it becomes obvious that small alterations of the assumed interest rate (r) change the outcomes considerably. A deviation from the interest rate of the standard scenario from three to two per cent leads e.g. to an increase of entitlements by 19 per cent. Also the level of the growth rate (g) has a sensitive impact on the results -as shown in Table 8 . Therefore, the absolute levels of pension entitlements should be taken with cautiousness. Furthermore, this exercise shows that it is essential to apply harmonized assumptions on the wage growth and the discount rate. Only on this basis one may compare estimates of pension entitlements across countries. Assumptions on the future mortality represent a further factor which affects the level of ADL as they determine the future payout phase of pension benefits. In our standard scenario we apply Table 9 which illustrates the change of results if different mortality assumptions are taken. It is interesting that the results do not differ considerably if e.g. the change of the life expectancy is 1.5 times higher. The result would be increased by roughly four per cent -see Table 9 . If in contrast the life expectancy of the base year would remain constant in future decades pension entitlements would shrink by roughly 7 per cent. Additionally, pension reforms may lead to changes of public pension entitlements. Their impact, however, depends on the specific reform measures adopted. Indexation rules show the largest effect on total pension entitlements (see Table 7 ). A change from a pure price indexation to a mixed indexation -with annual increases of benefits in line with 50 % of wage growth and 50 % of the price development -would lead to an increase of 9.6 %. The impact would be significantly higher with 20.4 % if a shift from a price to a wage indexation is legislated. But of course, this result depends greatly on the assumptions of the wage growth. A higher level of earnings increases would also raise the impact of the wage indexation on ADL estimates -and vice versa. An explanation for the considerable impact of indexation rules provides the compound interest effect. In line with this concept the level of pension indexation accumulates over a long retirement span. Additionally, all scheme members are affected by indexation changes, i.e. current retirees and current contributors.
Most other pension reforms only change entitlements of the group of current contributorssee examples below.
14 The sustainability factor of the Portuguese pension formula which adapts benefit levels in line with changes of the life expectancy is not considered here.
constant LE -7%
times higher LE -4%
standard scenario 0%
1.5 times higher LE 5% Increases of statutory retirement ages (RA) are a standard measure to cope with rises in life expectancy -observed in several countries (see Table 5 ). Its effect on the level of pension entitlements depends on the reform design, namely on the absolute rise of RA as well as on the introduction period. A slow increase of RA within a number of decades, as e.g. observed in Germany and Austria, has relatively little impact on pension entitlements. An increase of RA by e.g. 2 years within 20 years reduces pension entitlements by roughly 4 percent -see Table 11 . A more rapid rise, on the contrary, combined with a higher increase of RA by 5 years reduces ADL by about 13 percent. 
Applications
The new figures of ADL recorded in European national accounts from 2017 onwards may serve both researchers and policy makers for a wide variety of applications. As outlined in the previous section the impact of pension reforms on households' unfunded pension wealth can be measured by the figure of ADL. We showed that an alteration of the pension indexation formula may have a considerable effect on the level of households' pension entitlements. Standard pension policy indicators such as the replacement rate are not able to reflect the impact of indexation changes as they only compare pension payments of the first retirement period with pre-retirement earnings. The figures of ADL may, therefore, serve as one criterion for policy makers in addition to the currently used adequacy and sustainability pension indicators to assess pension reforms. Changes of entitlements due to pension reforms will be illustrated separately in a new supplementary table of national accounts on an annual basis from 2017 onwards (see Table 12 and row 7 in the appendix).
The costs of terminating a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension scheme may be measured with the figure of ADL. 17 They may, therefore, be applied to quantify the cost of a (partial) switch from a PAYG to a funded pension system. Moreover, ADL complete the picture of government obligations and therefore should be recorded in addition to the stock of public debt. 18 In Europe it was discussed in past years to add these newly recorded government liabilities to the Maastricht debt. This proposal has, however, been rejected.
As outlined in section 3 the amount of ADL usually ranges from 100 to 350 percent of GDP.
This number may be terrifying for policy makers at first glance -especially during the current turmoil of public finances. Therefore, it is crucial to outline also an important limitation of the figure of ADL. It cannot be used to evaluate the fiscal long-term stability of a public finances in general and of the pension scheme in isolation. For such a fiscal sustainability analysis the OSNL concept should be applied (see section 2). In other words, pension entitlements should be confronted with future revenues and the time horizon should be extended to include also entitlements accrued in future years. It is, therefore, important to underline that the extent of ADL of a certain country is not connected to any kind of good or bad state of fiscal affairs.
17 See Franco (1995) . 18 See Bovenberg and Petersen (1992) , Holzmann et al. (2001) .
From pension entitlements to households savings
It is often argued that the extent of unfunded pension entitlements may greatly determine the savings' behaviour of household. In the following sections we elaborate this hypothesis and discuss possible applications of ADL to explain cross country differences in saving rates.
One of the first authors to examine the impact of public unfunded pension schemes on savings was Feldstein (1974) . He presented time-series evidence for the United States showing that the American public pension system has suppressed households savings. Feldstein (1974) argued that a public pension system has two opposing effects on personal saving behaviour: It lowers personal savings because of reduced needs to accumulate assets for the retirement period ("asset-substitution-effect"). In addition, the existence of a public pension system increases personal savings as the availability of a public pension system induces an earlier retirement. A higher saving rate to realize a given level of old age income during the longer period of retirement is required ("induced retirement effect"). The net effect, the question whether a public pension system increases or decreases personal savings, depends on the relative strength of these ambiguous forces and can, therefore, only be resolved by empirical analysis. 19 Till these years, many studies aimed at determining the effects of a public pension system within a single country. Additionally, several studies estimate the level of social security benefits for a number of different countries in order to examine how the existence of these benefits is able to explain cross-country differences in private savings: Shortly after the first cross-country studies were published Feldstein (1980) , Barro and MacDonald (1979) , more and more variables had been tested for explaining international differences in saving rates: Koskela and Viren (1983) , for instance, added the unemployment rate as a proxy for real income uncertainty which showed to affect aggregate private savings positively. Other studies such as analyses Callen and Thimann (1997), Kessler et al. (1993) , Bloom et al. (2007) included variables like direct taxes, per capita public deficit or life expectancy into their.
As pointed out by Feldstein and Liebman (2002) , estimation of displacement effects using aggregate time series data -such as ADL figures -is always challenging. One can show the correctness of this claim by means of a simple example. Consider a stationary economy without population growth. Furthermore, let us assume three generations equal in cohort size: 1) very young, none-working generation, 2) middle aged working generation and 3) 19 See Feldstein (1976) , Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) .
elderly retired generation. The wage rate is constant over time. According to the life cycle hypothesis (LCH) as expressed by Ando and Modigliani (1963) , Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) Since most of the explanatory variables used in the available literature are expressed in percent of household disposable income, 21 they are vulnerable to endogeneity. This limitation can be, however, overcome by an identification of instrumental variables that are both relevant and exogenous. Unfortunately, for the studies that analyzed this relationship using aggregate data, this was not the case.
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Beside these econometric challenges, the selection of an appropriate proxy for unfunded pension wealth is of major interest. Most previous studies which chose a macro data approach applied replacement rates as a proxy for unfunded pension wealth. Our estimates, 20 See Browning and Lusardi (1996) . 21 See Bloom et al. (2007) , Callen and Thimann (1997) , Disney (2006) , Kessler et al. (1993) . 22 See Bloom et al. (2007) , Callen and Thimann (1997) , Disney (2006) , Kessler et al. (1993) .
however, show that there are substantial differences between the replacement rates (RR) and the ADL variable. These differences might be explained by the fact that the ADL variable
represents the yet accumulated pension wealth of the entire population. The RR, however, represents a crude approximation on the actual pension wealth of the section of the population that currently retires. 23 The The benefit level of current retirees reflected in RR may, therefore, be inappropriate to proxy anticipated pension wealth of future new retirees (current contributors). Third, ADLs reflect the coverage rate of public unfunded pension schemes in a respective country (by age and gender groups). Due to the above discussed limitations of aggregate data, most recent approaches use micro data to identify the offset between unfunded public pension entitlements and savings behavior. 24 Despite almost 40 years of research on the topic still no consensus has been reached on the order of magnitude of the asset-substitution-effect.
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Such a micro data approach is, however, also connected with a number of constraints. In detail, those datasets rarely contain information on financial wealth and even less on pension entitlements and typically cover relatively short time periods leading to the fact that, unfunded public pension entitlements does not exhibit much exogenous variation 24 See Diamond and Hausman (1984) , Jappelli (1995) , Hubbard (1986) , Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) , , Kapteyn and Panis (2005) , Gale (1998) , King (1982) , Hurd et al. (2012) . 25 In Europe, for instance, a high number of pension reforms took place in recent years, but the extend of the relationship between financial wealth accumulation and pension liabilities is still scanty and incomplete Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) . In his seminal paperFeldstein (1974) used aggregate time-series data from the US and determined displacement effects between -0.30 $ and -0.50 $ per additional $ of pension liabilities. A few years laterFeldstein (1980) used aggregate cross country data to determine a displacement effect of 0.37 $ per additional $ of pension liabilities. A recent approach using micro-data sets determined a displacement effect of 0.22 $ for every additional $ of pension liabilities Hurd et al. (2012) . 
Towards a full picture of households' wealth across Europe
Beside its application in policy and savings analyses, the new ADL figures may also be used to complete the picture of households' wealth on a cross-country level. Past international studies on households' wealth for the Euro-Area, 26 and around the globe, 27 so far disregarded a substantial part of households' wealth, ADL. Generally, three types of assets may be taken into account for wealth estimates. Besides the above described ADL, these include financial assets (FA) and non-financial assets (NFA). The last piece of the households' wealth puzzle represents the stock of NFA which mainly consists of dwellings. So far comparable cross country data on NFA was rather limited and, therefore, not used for international analyses. With the recent changes of European accounting rules EU member states will record aggregated dwellings figures in future years, too. We showed own estimates which base on these Eurostat recommendations. With a sample of 18 EU member states this survey represents the largest cross-country comparison for Europe so far. As a first conclusion, unfunded public pension entitlements are substantial in all EU countries assessed. Secondly, we observed a large cross-country variation ranging from 125 to 362 per cent of GDP. The largest ADLs in per cent of GDP can be found in France (362.2), Poland (361.1) and Austria (359.9), followed by Germany (329.6) and Italy (323.1). It might be a coincidence that all these countries possess a special pension scheme for civil servants but even without these schemes they are among the highest figures observed. In conclusion, our study showed that the new recording of unfunded public pension entitlements opens up a number of new fields for policy makers and researchers, in particular for wealth and savings cross country comparisons. These potential applications are however only feasible if a harmonized approach for ADL calculations across Europe is guaranteed.
Annex 1 Methodology of estimating ADL
The following section outlines in detail the estimation of unfunded public pension entilements. The starting point of the model 28 applied is the method of generational accounting. 29 In general this method can be used for a wide variety of purposes. For this study, the method is applied for public pension schemes in isolation and for the group of existing retirees and current contributors (future retirees) only. 30 Additionaly, the standard method is modified in order to account for the accrued-to-date amount of benefits instead of considering full future pension benefits (accrued after a complete contribution history).
Our calculations include old-age pensions, disability pensions and survivor pensions. Any kind of means-tested social existence is excluded -as far as feasible. We outline below the entire calculation procedure in five steps.
Step 1 -Projecting existing retirees' pensions: We start with the estimation of the average age-sex-specific existing retirees' benefits in the base year. The projection of these pension benefits is the centre piece of the calculations since we develop the future new retirees' accrued pension benefits by a modification of the existing retirees' benefits. Please note that future new retirees involve all individuals which retire after the base year, while exisiting retirees are already in retirement in the base year. Each average representative of an age group is to some extent an existing and a future new retiree in every year of his or her life-cycle.
Generating age-specific pension profiles
First of all, the base year benefits are calculated by distributing the aggregated amount of today's pension expenditures to the different cohorts in retirement age. By this procedure we create an age-sex-specific benefits' cross-section profile generated from the budget and micro data of the observed country. It reflects heterogeneous retirement behaviour. 31 28 The model decribed has been developed to carry out benchmark calculations of public pension liabilities on behalf of the Eurostat/ECB Contact Group on Pensions for 19 EU countries Müller et al. (2009) . 29 This method was developed by Auerbach et al. (1991) . See Bonin (2001) , Raffelhüschen (1999) for a detailed depiction of theory and application as well as limitations of the method of generational accounting. 30 For a closer look on the application of generational accounting to public pension schemes see Moog and Müller (2011), Müller et al. (2010) 
Typical for most European pension schemes is the sharp increase of the pension profile around the age of 60. Such a steep rise can also be observed in the German example (see Figure 5 ). It mainly reflects an increasing share of pension cases, i.e. the retirement probabilities around the age of 60 are relatively high. 33 It should be noted that the profile also reveals other age-specific characteristica, namely the average participation rate in the respective pension scheme (in per cent of the population) as well as the average pension benefits at a given age (B b,k ).
32 Since our projection method does not correct aggregates for business cycle effects, base year economic performance is perpetuated indefinitely. This may lead to a bias. Nonetheless this effect seems not as critical in case of considering pension expenditures only since they are for the most part dominated by demography. 33 At this point it is worth mentioning that we employ age-sex-specific pension data which is broken down into one-year intervals. Most former surveys use five-year interval data which can lead to inaccuracies especially when looking at the cohorts retiring in. Source: own calculations.
34
Rescaling of existing retirees´ pension benefits
Formally, the estimation of the existing retirees' benefits is based on the following identity:
This identity states that the sum of age-specific individual pension benefits p b,k (in the base year b of the cohort born in k) weighted with the cohort size C b,k must equal the corresponding overall aggregate pension expenditures, denoted by P b . 35 The problem of equation 2 is that it holds only in theory. While macroeconomic data, typically taken from national accounting statistics, is relatively exact, micro data is in general difficult to gather and tends to be afflicted with inaccuracies. To resolve this problem we estimate re-scaled age-sex-specific benefit profiles. This is done in two steps. First, age-sex-specific information regarding per capita pension benefits has to be collected in order to capture the relative fiscal position of different age groups as accurately as possible. The vector of relative pension benefits by age taken from the statistics, ( t,t-D , … t,k , …,  t,t ) , is then 34 The profiles applied include payments regarding old-age pensions, disability pensions and survivor pensions. In doing so, we are able to take into account survivor pensions in a more accurate way, compared to most other surveys dealing with the measurement of pension liabilities such as Holzmann et al. (2001) . 35 Please note that D represents the maximum age of an individual which is 100 years by our assumption. 36 Note that this vector is supposed to show only the relative pension position in period t of an individual born in the year k and thus imposes less restriction on the accuracy and availability of micro data on the absolute level. Second, the estimated relative age distribution is tallied with the corresponding aggregate pension benefit P b by application of a proportional, non-age-specific benchmarking factor, denoted by . The relative distribution of pension payments is re-evaluated according to it is assured that the micro pension data matches the given macro data.
Projection of existing retirees´ pension benefits
Finally, the resulting rescaled average age-sex-specific existing retirees' benefits are projected according to the indexation rules of the respective country:
, , we phase out year-by-year the rescaled age-sex-specific existing retirees' profile and index the pension benefits according to the benefit formula.
Step 2 -Projecting future new retirees' pensions: The age-sex-specific pension profile for future new retirees, which is the basis for the estimation of accrued-to-date entitlements, 36 For ease of notation we drop the sex-specific notation as from now on.
is calculated by manipulating the base year existing retirees' benefits. 37 This is done in four stages.
for all cohorts b-D  k  b.
Valorization of a future new retirees'pension benefit
In a first step, we will distance ourselves from the accrued-to-date idea, just as it is exercised in the model primarily. In every single year after the base year, new pensioners will enter the pension scheme. The question to be answered first is what the amount of the first paid benefit will be in relation to the new pensioners' benefits in the base year. Let the amount of first paid pension -sometimes referred to as the primary insurance amount (PIA) -in the year be and the constant per-capita wage growth in real terms be .
When applying the PBO approach, the first paid pension will be defined like the following:
Since is assumed to be constant over time, the first paid pension can also be expressed subject to the base year . Changing to the ABO approach, one has to bear in mind that no allowance is made for future pay increases. In the current case, only the general wage growth is observed. It follows that the first paid pension of a future year t in the ABO approach changes to:
The difference between equations 12 and 13 can be explained by the different approaches of ABO and PBO. PBO takes into account general future wage growth while ABO does not consider any future changes of earnings; the wage level of the base year is held constant in real terms. 45 The second difference between ABO and PBO can be observed when reducing the primarily calculated full benefits of "new pensioners" according to the concept of ADL. The full benefits are reduced by a vector -the "accrued-to-date vector" -, which expresses the share of entitlements earned until the base year to the amount of entitlements which qualifies for a full pension. This share is given for every projection year. It is straightforward that the share decreases from a value close to one for primary pensions paid out shortly after the base year up to a value of close to zero for primary pensions paid out in the far future. This vector is multiplied with the respective accounts of full pension entitlements and the outcome is the amount of pension entitlements earned up to the base year for 45 It is crucial that this only counts for the calculation of the first paid pension or PIA. When projecting a benefit which has already been paid out before, i.e. the indexation of existing benefits, a constant real wage growth is assumed. In this regard the ABO approach displays a schizophrenic world where in one situation future wage growth is considered and in the other it is not. Please note, that there are other interpretations of the ABO approach which do not consider (post-retirement) pension indexation. every projection year, the accrued-to-date entitlements. The difference between ABO and PBO in this regard is given by the different consideration of personal earnings increases during working life. Generally, the earnings at the beginning of a career is less than the average earnings and turns out somewhere above average closer to retirement -PBO takes this effect into account, ABO does not.
Regarding the accrued-to-date vector in the PBO approach, only the missing amount of contribution years has to be taken into account, due to the fact that the full pension primarily calculated by the model includes assumptions for personal and general wage growth. In summary, the difference between ABO and PBO consists of two parts. The first part is the general wage growth, in most cases connected to general economic growth. The second part is the development of earnings over the contribution career.
Annex 2 New supplementary table on pension entitlements in national accounts
From 2017 onwards a new supplementary table on pension schemes will be introduced in European national accounts. It covers the stocks of aggregate entitlements of various types of pension schemes, namely those recorded in the non-government sector (columns A-C) as well as those attributed to the government sector (D-H). Unfunded public pension entitlements are shown in column G for government employees and column H for social security pension schemes. The supplementary table also outlines the flows leading to a change of entitlements during a given year. This includes inter alia changes due to pension reforms (see row 7), increases due to actual contributions paid (rows 2.1 and 2.2.) as well as reductions in entitlements due to benefits paid out (row 3). 
